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The development of electronic publishing and the dissatisfaction with academic journal price escalations has led to an increasing support for the open access 
model (also called the author-pays model), where authors pay for submitting and/or 
publishing their articles, while readers can access published articles at no charge via 
the Internet. There are (as of October 8, 2009) 4,366 open access journals covering 
all fields (of which 88 are in the field of economics),1 and open access publishing cur-
rently represents approximately 5 percent of the total market for academic journals.2
The report of the Science and Technology Committee of the UK House of 
Commons (House of Commons 2004, henceforth) gives an overview of issues 
related to author-pays publishing. The main argument in favor of open access is 
greater dissemination of research findings, whereas the report expresses concerns 
that an author-pays model may induce authors to publish less because of problems of 
affordability. Along similar lines, Mathias Dewatripont et al. (2006, 11) recommend 
1 See the Directory of Open Access Journals’ (DOAJ) Web site (www.doaj.org). 
2 See House of Commons Science and Technology Committee (2004, 73). Among major open access publish-
ing initiatives, one can mention the Public Library of Science (PLoS) and BioMed Central.
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The Pricing of Academic Journals:
A Two-Sided Market Perspective†
By Doh-Shin Jeon and Jean-Charles Rochet*
More and more academic journals are adopting an open access pol-
icy by which articles are accessible free of charge, while publication 
costs are recovered through author fees. We study the consequences 
of this open access policy on the quality standard of an electronic 
academic journal. If the journal’s objective were to maximize social 
welfare, open access would be optimal. However, we show that if 
the journal has a different objective (such as maximizing readers’ 
utility, the impact of the journal, or its profit), open access tends to 
induce it to choose a quality standard below the socially efficient 
level. (JEL L11, L82)
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 funding  authorities to create a “level-playing field” between reader-pays and author-
pays models by “allocating money to libraries to subscribe to reader- or library-
pay journals but also to authors to pay for publication costs in author-pay journals”. 
Another type of concern, which is the focus of our paper, is that author fees may 
induce journal editors to accept a higher proportion of articles, which may have 
negative implications for quality.3
In this paper, we build a model of an academic journal that fulfills a double role of 
certification and dissemination of knowledge and study its pricing from a two-sided 
market perspective. We aim to generate insights useful to policy makers by conducting 
both normative and positive analyses. Adopting a normative viewpoint, we show that, 
for an electronic journal maximizing social welfare, open access is socially optimal 
because the marginal cost of providing access to a reader is zero. If subsidizing read-
ing were feasible, it would even be optimal to do so because each reader exerts positive 
externalities on the rest of society.4 An example of these externalities is development 
of innovations inspired by the ideas contained in the articles. Even though authors also 
exert positive externalities by publishing their articles, there is no need to subsidize 
authors for submitting articles as long as they get substantial benefits from publication, 
while the submission cost remains negligible.5
Then, adopting a positive perspective, we study how the move from the traditional 
reader-pays model to the open access model affects a journal’s quality standard, both 
for a not-for-profit journal and for a for-profit journal.6 We find that in both cases, but 
for different reasons, the move might decrease quality below the socially efficient 
level. First, we consider a not-for-profit journal run by an academic association. If 
the objective of the association were to maximize social welfare, the move to open 
access would lead to the social optimum. However, the association is likely to pursue 
its own objective. We consider two possibilities for its objective: the total utility of 
the readers or the impact of the journal.7 We find that the association tends to choose 
too high a quality standard under the reader-pays model, while it tends to choose too 
low a quality standard under open access, compared with the second best level. A 
simple intuition can be given in terms of internalization of costs. First, a social wel-
fare maximizing journal internalizes the publication cost γ (> 0) minus the author’s 
fixed benefit from publication u(> 0). It is reasonable to assume γ − u > 0.8 Second, 
3 According to House of Commons (2004, 81), “if author-pays publishing were to become the dominant model, 
there is a risk that some parts of the market would be able to produce journals quickly, at high volume and with 
reduced quality control.…”
4 This implies that open access can also be optimal for a printed journal (that has a positive cost of dissemina-
tion) if the positive externalities exerted by readers exceed the marginal cost of dissemination (reproduction and 
distribution).
5 We focus on the dissemination of research articles and do not model the prior stage in which these articles 
are produced. Needless to say, subsidizing production of articles is socially desirable.
6 In the price search engine on internationally published journals (www.journalprices.com), maintained by 
Ted Bergstrom and Preston McAfee, as of March 31, 2010, 5,645 among 8,962 journals in 17 fields are for-profit 
journals.
7 The missions stated by some not-for-profit journals are “to advance science and serve society” (Science), “to 
publish highly selective, widely cited articles of current relevance” (Journal of Political Economy), “to publish 
original articles in all branches of economics” (Econometrica). The objectives we consider are consistent with 
the above missions.
8 Otherwise, it might be socially optimal to publish all articles, and then the journal would not have any 
certification role.
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a not-for-profit journal maximizing readers’ utilities under the reader-pays model 
has to recover γ entirely from subscription revenues, but it does not internalize u, 
which leads to publishing too few articles. On the contrary, a not-for-profit journal 
maximizing readers’ utilities under the open access model internalizes neither γ 
(since its costs are covered with author fees) nor u, which leads to publishing too 
many articles. Furthermore, this quality degradation under open access can result 
in reducing the number of readers compared with the level under the reader-pays 
model, if publishing too many articles induces many high-cost readers to stop read-
ing the journal. However, we find that as long as the number of readers is larger 
under open access than under the reader-pays model, the change from the reader-
pays model to the open access model unambiguously increases social welfare. In 
addition, we show that under open access, an impact-maximizing journal chooses 
the same quality standard (and hence the same number of readers) as the one chosen 
by a journal maximizing readers’ utility.
In the case of a for-profit journal, we also find (see the Appendix) that it tends 
to choose too high a quality standard under the reader-pays model, while it can 
choose too low a standard under open access. Under the reader-pays model, publish-
ing low-quality articles that give readers a benefit smaller than their reading cost 
only reduces the journal’s profit. On the contrary, under open access, the journal 
does not internalize inframarginal readers’ costs of reading, as long as they are will-
ing to read the journal. Therefore, the journal can have an incentive to publish low-
quality articles in order to increase its profit from author fees. In summary, in the 
case of a for-profit journal, quality degradation is caused by the noninternalization 
of reading costs, while in the case of a not-for-profit journal maximizing readers’ 
utility (and hence internalizing reading costs), quality degradation is caused by the 
non-internalization of publication costs.
Our paper builds on two strands of the literature. First, it builds on the litera-
ture on two-sided markets (see, for example, Jean-Charles Rochet and Jean Tirole 
2002, 2003, 2006; Bernard Caillaud and Bruno Jullien 2003; David S. Evans 2003, 
Simon P. Anderson and Stephen Coate 2005; Mark Armstrong 2006; and Andrei 
Hagiu 2006). Two-sided markets can be roughly defined as industries in which plat-
forms provide interaction services between two (or several) kinds of users. Typical 
examples are payment cards, software, Internet, and media. In such industries, it is 
vital for platforms to find a price structure that attracts sufficient numbers of users 
on each side of the market. Our paper has two novel aspects. First, in addition to 
choosing a price for each side, the platform (i.e., the academic journal) can choose 
a minimum quality standard. Second, the externality from authors to readers is not 
always positive. As the number of published articles increases (and as the quality 
standard decreases), the net utility that a reader obtains from the platform increases, 
up to a maximum, and then decreases.
Second, our paper builds on the literature on the economics of academic jour-
nals, which has initially adopted a one-sided perspective, focusing on library sub-
scriptions (Mark McCabe 2004, Doh-Shin Jeon and Domenico Menicucci 2006 
and Armstrong 2009). For instance, Jeon and Menicucci (2006) show that bundling 
electronic journals makes it difficult for small publishers to sell their journals. To 
our knowledge, McCabe and Christopher Snyder (2005a, 2005b, 2006, 2007) are 
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the first papers to study the pricing of academic journals from a two-sided market 
perspective. McCabe and Snyder (2006, 2007) study pricing of academic journals 
under different industry structures (monopoly, duopoly, free entry), but, in their 
model, all articles have the same quality, and journals do not provide any certifi-
cation function.9 Our model is closer to McCabe and Snyder (2005a, 2005b), who 
consider a monopoly journal providing certification services. However, there are sig-
nificant differences with our approach. McCabe and Snyder (2005a, 2005b) take the 
quality standard of the journal as given (it is determined by the talent of its editors) 
and examine how this quality standard affects the subscription price, and thereby 
the adoption of open access.10 By contrast, we endogenize the quality standard of the 
journal and study how the move from the reader-pays model to open access affects 
this quality standard and the readership size of the journal.11
The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section I presents our model. 
Section II characterizes the first best allocation. Section III characterizes the sec-
ond-best allocation, defined as the one that maximizes social welfare under the 
constraint that reading cannot be subsidized. Section IV studies the policy chosen 
by a not-for-profit journal maximizing readers’ utility under the reader-pays model 
and under open access. Section V performs a comparison among four different out-
comes. Section VI considers, as robustness checks, a hybrid model (charging both 
author fee and subscription price) and an impact-maximizing journal. Section VII 
concludes. The Appendix includes proofs and the analysis of a for-profit journal.
I.  The Model
We consider a single academic journal, modeled as a platform between a contin-
uum of authors and a continuum of potential readers. The mass of authors is normal-
ized to one. Each author has one article, which embodies “ideas” that may be useful 
to readers, for example, because they allow them to develop innovations. The benefit 
from each innovation is not fully appropriated by the reader/innovator, but spills 
over to the rest of society, including to the author herself, through peer recognition.
The only way in which authors and readers can interact is through the academic 
journal.12 Three conditions are required for this interaction to occur:
•  Authors must submit their articles to the journal.
•  The journal must referee them and publish only those that meet its quality 
standard.
•  Readers must read the published articles.
9 An exception is section 5.4 in McCabe and Snyder (2007), where they consider free entry and quality certifi-
cation and obtain a specialization result, articles of different qualities are published by different journals.
10 They find that open access is more likely to be chosen by a journal with poor editorial talent.
11 There are three other differences. First, they do not consider a not-for-profit journal. Second, they consider 
binary support for an article’s quality. Last, they assume that every author has the same prior belief about the 
quality of her article.
12 This is because we assume that the average quality of the unpublished articles that are directly accessible 
through the Internet is so low that readers prefer to look only at published articles. Thus, the academic journal 
plays a fundamental certification role. It filters out “junk’’ articles.
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Thus, in our model, the academic journal plays two crucial roles: it disseminates 
academic production (i.e., articles), and it certifies the quality of these articles in order 
to convince readers to read the journal. Since time is costly to readers, they will read 
the journal only if they anticipate that the average quality of articles is good enough. 
Symmetrically, the benefit that an author obtains from publication increases with the 
readership size of the journal. Thus, we are in a “chicken and egg” situation, charac-
teristic of two-sided markets, where the platform (here the academic journal) has to 
attract both sides (here authors and readers) to be successful. However, by contrast 
with most of the literature on two-sided markets, the platform controls not only the 
number of interactions, but also their quality through its certification function.
The quality of each article is measured by a number q that is independently drawn 
from the same distribution, with support [0, qmax ]. We assume that the quality of an 
article is privately observed by its author. The journal has a perfect refereeing tech-
nology. By incurring a cost γR, it can observe perfectly the quality of a submitted 
article. Since our focus is on electronic journals, distributed through the Internet, we 
assume that the marginal cost of distribution is zero.13 The journal incurs a publica-
tion cost γP per published article. It includes the cost of making the first (electronic) 
copy and any fixed cost of distribution per article (such as the cost of buying capacity 
to post an article). The journal commits to publish all submitted articles of quality 
q ≥ qmin, where qmin is the minimum quality standard chosen by the journal. In addi-
tion, the journal chooses its pricing policy. It charges pS to all submitted articles, an 
additional pP to all published articles, and a subscription fee pR to each reader.
Readers cannot observe the quality of an article before reading it, but observe its 
quality after reading it. We assume that an article’s quality cannot be verified ex post 
by a third party, and therefore the journal’s pricing scheme cannot be conditioned on 
realized quality14.
The mass of readers is also normalized to one. All readers obtain the same 
expected benefit q after reading an article of quality q, but differ in their “reading 
cost” c, which is independently drawn from a distribution with support included 
in [0, ∞). Readers’ benefit includes not only the increase in their knowledge, but 
also the utility that they obtain from its use (such as production of other scientific 
articles, patents, commercial applications). As already mentioned, when an article is 
read, some utility from its potential applications also spills over to the rest of soci-
ety, including to the author herself. More precisely, when an article of quality q is 
 published by the journal, the total (that is, monetary and nonmonetary) benefit that 
the author obtains is given by
 u + αAqnR,
where u(> 0) and αA(> 0) are constants, and nR represents the number of readers. u is a 
fixed component. It corresponds to the utility from having one article published in the 
13 However, our arguments can also be applied to a print journal, provided the marginal cost of printing and 
distributing copies is not too big.
14 McCabe and Snyder (2005a, 2005b) assume it as well. It can be justified by the fact that a court cannot 
perfectly verify the quality of scientific articles.
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journal. For instance, if a tenure decision depends solely on the number of articles pub-
lished in particular journals, a tenure-track professor derives some utility from pub-
lishing her article in those journals, this independently of the quality of the article.15 
By contrast, αAqnR is a variable component. It depends on the quality of the article. 
We interpret qnR as the impact of the article, proportional to the number of subsequent 
citations or to the number of patents that are subsequently based on the article. The 
constant αA(> 0) measures the strength of the relation between publication impact and 
authors’ utility. A similar term αS qnR with αS(> 0) represents the benefit that spills 
over to the rest of society. We denote by α = αA + αS the total externality term.
The timing of the game is as follows:
 •  The journal announces its editorial policy (qmin ) and its prices ( pS, pP, pR).
 •  Authors decide whether or not to submit their articles to the journal.
 •  The journal referees all submitted articles and accepts or rejects each of them.
 •  Readers decide whether or not to buy the journal and read the articles.
Since both the author and the journal perfectly observe the quality q of a submit-
ted article, the author perfectly knows whether or not her article will be accepted. 
Therefore, if q < qmin and pS > 0, she will not submit the article. By contrast, 
if q > qmin, the article will be accepted, and she will have to pay the author fee 
pA(≡ pS + pP). This implies an indeterminacy between pS and pP; only pA matters. 
The fact that only articles of quality superior to qmin are submitted in our model
16 
also implies that what matters for the journal is only the sum of the publication 
cost per article (γP) and the refereeing cost per article (γR ), not its composition. Let γ ≡ γP + γR. We assume γ > u, implying that even when the reading cost is zero, 
publishing the lowest quality article (i.e., the one with q = 0) is not socially optimal. 
This assumption captures the certification role of the academic journal. By reject-
ing articles of low quality, the journal allows readers to concentrate on important 
articles and avoid proliferation of bad ones.
In summary, when an article is published in the journal, its author gets a fixed 
utility u, while the journal incurs a fixed cost γ(> u). When an article of quality q is 
read by a reader of cost c, the reader gets net utility (q − c), and the rest of society 
(including the author) gets utility αq.
Each potential reader decides whether to read the journal or not, based on his 
expectation of the quality of published articles and on his (unit) cost of reading c. If 
the nA best articles are published, the net utility of a reader of cost c is:
 uR = nA[ Q a(nA) − c] − pR,
15  u can also represent recognition from nonpeers who do not read the journal.
16 We assume, however, that the journal commits to effectively referee all submitted articles.
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where Q a(nA ) is the (anticipated) average quality of the articles published in the jour-
nal.17 This average quality can be inferred perfectly from the minimum quality stan-
dard qmin announced by the journal. Indeed, let us denote by q(nA ) the nA-th quantile of 
the distribution of articles’ qualities (ranked by decreasing quality, q(·) is thus decreas-
ing). This distribution is supposed to be common knowledge. We have by definition:
(1) Pr (q ≥ q(nA )) = nA,
(2) Q a(nA) =   ∫0 
nA
   q(x) dx
 ________ nA  ,
while
(3) qmin = q(nA ).
Similarly, the number nR of readers can be perfectly anticipated by authors, since 
the distribution of readers’ costs is also supposed to be common knowledge. Let 
c(nR) denote the nR-th quantile of the cost distribution (ranked by increasing cost, 
c(·) is thus increasing). We have by definition:
(4)    Pr (c ≤ c(nR)) = nR.
Moreover the utility of the marginal reader is zero, and thus
(5) nA[ Q a(nA) − c(nR)] = pR .
Thus, knowing qmin and pR (and the distributions of costs and qualities), each 
author can infer the number nA of published articles, the average quality Q 
a(nA) of 
these published articles, and, by (5), the number of readers. Figure 1 describes the 
journal as a platform mediating authors and readers.
II.  The First-Best Allocation
In this section, we derive the first-best outcome, that would be implemented by 
a social planner who could choose who reads the journal and which articles are 
published. Obviously, if there are nA articles published and nR readers, efficiency 
requires that these are the articles with the highest qualities (q ≥ q(nA)) and the 
17 This formula presumes that the readers who subscribe to the journal read all the articles it contains. It is 
indeed optimal for them to do so since the cost of reading articles is proportional to the number of articles, and 
articles’ qualities are indistinguishable a priori. Our analysis could be extended to the case in which partial read-
ing can be optimal because reading cost is strictly convex in the number of articles or because the journal signals 
the quality of published articles by ranking them (“lead” article).
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readers with the lowest costs (c ≤ c(nR)). Social welfare, denoted by W(nA, nR) is 
then given by:
(6) W(nA, nR) ≡  (1 + α)nR  ∫ 0 
nA
   q(x) dx − nA(γ − u) − nA  ∫ 0 
nR
   c(y) dy.
In formula (6), the first term represents social benefit (readers + authors + the rest 
of society) when the nA best articles are published and read by the nR most efficient 
readers. The second term represents the total cost of publishing the journal, minus 
the total fixed benefit of authors, and the last term represents the aggregate cost of 
reading the journal.
We assume that the parameters are such that the maximum of W is interior: the 
proportion of published articles is strictly between zero and one. Then, from the first 
order condition, with respect to nA, we have:
(7)  (1 + α)nR q(nA ) = (γ − u) +  ∫ 0 
nR
   c(y) dy.
Given that the nR readers with c ≤ c(nR) read the journal, condition (7) means that 
the optimal number of articles published, nA, is determined by equalizing the social 
marginal benefit from publishing an article of quality q(nA), i.e., (1 + α)nR  q(nA), to 
the social marginal cost, which is equal to the sum of the net cost of publishing an 
article (γ − u) and the aggregate cost of reading an article  ∫0 nR   c(y) dy. Condition (7) 
can be rewritten as:
(8)  (1 + α)q(nA ) =  γ − u _____ nR  + c a(nR),
where
    c a(nR) =   ∫0 
nR
   c(y) dy
 ________ nR  
denotes the average cost of readers.
Journal
quality q cost c
nonsubscribers
subscribers
readers
0
c(nR)
published
articles
unpublished
articles
articles
0
q(nA) = qmin
qmax
Figure 1. The Journal as a Platform
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From the first order condition, with respect to nR, we have:
(9)    (1 + α)  ∫ 
0
 
nA
   q(x) dx = nAc(nR).
Given that the nA articles with quality q ≥ q(nA ) are published by the journal, condi-
tion (9) means that the optimal number of readers is determined by equalizing the 
social benefit from having one additional reader to the total cost of reading incurred 
by this marginal reader. Condition (9) is equivalent to
(10)    (1 + α)Q a(nA ) = c(nR).
Since the externality term α is positive, condition (10) implies that for the marginal 
reader, the average utility from reading an article of the journal is lower than her cost 
of reading it. Thus, as we shall see below, the marginal reader should be subsidized. 
This is because she generates positive externalities on the rest of society by increas-
ing the impact of articles and/or the number of innovations derived from them. Let ( n A  fB  ,  n R  fB  ) denote the first-best allocation, characterized by conditions (8) and (10).
We now study the minimum quality standard  q min  
fB
 and the prices (  p A  fB  ,  p R  fB  ) that 
implement the first-best outcome ( n A  fB  ,  n R  fB  ) when the social planner has to satisfy 
the participation constraints for both authors and readers. Obviously,  q min  
fB
 must be 
equal to q( n A  fB  ). Given nR, let uA(nA : nR) denote the utility that the nA-th author 
derives from publishing her article in the journal. We have:
(11) uA(nA : nR) = αAq(nA )nR + u − pA.
In order to induce the submission of all articles of quality superior to q( n A  fB  ), the 
following constraint must be satisfied:
  (PcA ) uA( n A  fB  :  n R  fB  ) = αAq( n A  fB  ) n R  fB  + u − pA ≥  0,
which is equivalent to
 pA ≤ αAq( n A  fB  ) n R  fB  +  u ≡   p A   max  .
Given nA, let uR(nR : nA ) denote the utility that the nR -th reader derives from sub-
scribing to (and reading) the journal. We have
(12) uR(nR : nA ) = [ Q a(nA) − c(nR)]nA − pR.
In order to align each reader’s incentive to subscribe to the journal (and to read 
it) with the social incentive (i.e., in order to induce only those with c ≤ c( n R  fB  ) to 
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subscribe to the journal), the following incentive constraint18 has to be satisfied for 
the marginal reader:
  (IcR) uR( n R  fB  :  n A  fB  ) = [ Q a( n A  fB  ) − c( n R  fB  )] n A  fB  − pR = 0,
which is equivalent to
 pR = [ Q a( n A  fB ) − c( n R  fB )] n A  fB  ≡   p R  fB  .
From (10), we have
(13)  p R  fB  = −αQ a( n A  fB ) n A  fB  < 0.
Therefore,  p R  
fB
  must be strictly negative. By contrast,  p A  
fB
  can be strictly positive. 
This is because an author derives a strictly positive utility from publishing her article 
in the journal, but incurs no submission cost. This implies that charging a small (but 
positive) price is compatible with the submission of all articles of quality higher 
than q( n A  fB ). In fact, any pA ≤  p A  max  achieves it. By contrast, each reader must incur a 
cost of reading the journal. Since reading generates positive externalities to the rest 
of society, it is optimal to subsidize readers by charging a subscription price that is 
lower than the marginal distribution cost. For an electronic journal, this distribution 
cost is zero, so that the subscription price must be negative. Summarizing, we have:
PROPOSITION 1: (first-best) 
 (i )  The first-best allocation ( n A  fB ,  n R  fB ) is characterized by:
  (1 + α)q(nA ) = γ −  u __ nR  + c a (nR),
  (1 + α)Q a(nA ) = c(nR ).
  (ii) To implement the first-best allocation, the social planner has to choose a 
minimum quality standard equal to  q min  
fB
 ≡  q( n A  fB ) and prices (  p A  fB ,  p R  fB ) 
satisfying
  p A  
 fB
  ≤ αAq( n A  fB ) n R  fB  + u ≡   p A   max  ;  p R   fB  = −αQ a( n A  fB ) n A   fB  .
Therefore, the subscription price must be strictly negative.
18 We call it an incentive constraint instead of calling it a participation constraint since a participation con-
straint is usually defined by an inequality.
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III.  The Second-Best Allocation
In the previous analysis of the first-best allocation, we have made the somewhat 
implausible assumption that the social planner could induce a marginal reader of 
type c( n R  fB ) to read the journal by subsidizing it. However, charging a negative sub-
scription price would not, in practice, necessarily induce the marginal reader to read 
the journal. This is because it is hard to monitor whether or not someone effectively 
reads the journal. Consequently, a negative subscription price would induce fake 
readers who have no, or very weak, interest in reading the journal to subscribe to it 
only to obtain the subsidy. Therefore, we now consider the second-best outcome in 
which the social planner is constrained to charge a nonnegative subscription price 
( pR ≥ 0).
Given pR, the marginal reader is determined by
 uR(nR : nA ) =   ∫ 0 
nA
   q(x) dx − c(nR)nA − pR = 0.
Therefore, requiring pR ≥ 0 is equivalent to requiring
(14)  c(nR)nA ≤  ∫ 0 
nA
   q(x) dx.
Hence, in the second best outcome, the social planner maximizes W(nA, nR) subject 
to (14). Again, we assume that the parameters are such that in the (second-best) opti-
mum, the proportion of published articles is strictly between zero and one. Define 
LSB = W − λ1[c(nR)nA −  ∫0 nA   q(x) dx], where λ1(≥ 0) represents the Lagrange mul-
tiplier associated with (14). The first-order conditions with respect to nA and nR are
(15)    (1 + α)nR q(nA) = (γ − u) +  ∫ 0 
nR
   c(y) dy + λ1[c(nR) − q(nA)],
(16)    (1 + α)  ∫ 
0
 
nA
   q(x) dx = nAc(nR) + λ1c′(nR )nA.
When condition (14) binds, we find from (16)
  λ1  =  αc(nR) _____c′(nR)  > 0.
Inserting λ1 = αc(nR)/c′(nR) into (15) gives
(17)    (1 + α)nR q(nA) = (γ − u) +  ∫ 0 
nR
   c(y) dy +  αc(nR) _____
c′(nR)  [c(nR) − q(nA)]
VOL. 2 NO. 2 233JEON ANd ROcHET: THE PRIcINg Of AcAdEMIc JOuRNALS
The fact that (14) binds implies that
(18)    c(nR) = Q a(nA).
In other words, the marginal reader’s reading cost is equal to the average quality of 
the articles published in the journal. This, together with Q a(nA) > q(nA) implies that 
when we compare (7) with (15), the social marginal cost of publishing one more 
article is larger in the second-best allocation than in the first-best (this is because 
the additional term λ1[c(nR) − q(nA)] is positive). Similarly, comparing (9) with (16) 
shows that the social marginal cost of having one more reader is larger in the second-
best than in the first-best. Let ( n A  SB ,  n R  SB ) denote the second-best allocation, character-
ized by (17) and (18). The previous arguments imply that  n A  fB  >  n A  SB  and  n R  fB  >  n R  SB , 
at least if W is quasi concave. These inequalities will be established formerly in 
Section V, in the case of iso-elastic distribution functions.
Let (  p A  SB ,  p R  SB ) denote a price vector implementing ( n A  SB ,  n R  SB ) when the social plan-
ner chooses the quality standard q SB ≡ q( n A  SB ). Since (14) binds, we have  p R  SB  = 0. 
Therefore, open access is second-best optimal.  p A  
SB
  has to satisfy the participation 
constraint of the marginal author, implying:
  p A  
SB
  ≤ αAq( n A  SB ) n R  SB  + u.
PROPOSITION 2: (Second-best) When a negative subscription price is not feasible:
  (i) Open access is socially optimal.
  (ii) In this case, the second-best allocation ( n A  SB ,  n R  SB ) is characterized by (17) and (18). In particular, the marginal reader’s cost is equal to the average quality 
of published articles.
  (iii) If W is quasi-concave in (nA, nR), then the second-best allocation involves 
less publications and less readers than the first-best:  n A  
SB
  <  n A  fB  and  n R  SB  < 
n R  
fB
  .
Proposition 2 characterizes the situations in which open access is optimal. When the 
positive externalities generated by readers (for instance through the innovations derived 
from academic articles) exceed the cost of distributing articles (which is zero for an 
Internet journal), and when subsidizing reading is not feasible (so that the first-best is 
not attainable), it is optimal to charge a zero subscription price. This reduces the number 
of readers with respect to the first-best allocation, which reduces the net social benefit 
from publishing an article. Therefore, the minimum quality standard is higher in the 
second-best allocation than in the first-best. Note that the second-best allocation coin-
cides with the Ramsey optimum as long as the marginal author’s benefit from publica-
tion is larger than γ.19 Figure 2 describes the first-best and the second-best allocations.
19 In footnote 29, we give the condition under which the marginal author’s benefit from publication is larger 
than γ for an open access not-for-profit journal, in the case of iso-elastic distribution functions. Later, we also 
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IV.  Positive Analysis
In this section, we adopt a positive viewpoint and analyze the consequences of the 
move from reader-pays to open access for a not-for-profit journal run by an academic 
association. If the objective of the association were to maximize social welfare, this 
move would lead to the (second-best) social optimum. However, the association is 
likely to pursue its own objective. We consider two possibilities for the objective 
function of the association: the total utility of the readers20 (in Section IV) or the 
impact of the journal (in Section VIB). Our main result, that open access is likely 
to lead to a decrease in the quality of academic journals, holds for both objective 
functions. We start (in Section IVA) by explaining the basic intuition behind this 
result, and then formally characterize the outcomes under reader-pays (RP ) and 
open access (OA ).
A. The Basic Intuition
Recall that the readership of the journal is determined by the indifference of the 
marginal reader:
 uR(nR : nA ) ≡ [Q a(nA) − c(nR)]nA − pR = 0.
show that the journal’s quality is higher under the second-best than under the open access not-for-profit journal. 
Thus, if the condition holds, the marginal author’s benefit is larger than γ in the second-best as well.
20 Here, we have in mind a situation in which the association maximizes its members’ utilities, and one 
becomes a member by subscribing to its journal. In a more general framework, the association would internalize 
some fraction of authors’ utilities as well, since some members are also authors. Our formulation captures, in a 
simple way, the bias in the objective of the association toward the readers, as compared with that of the social 
planner.
q
qmax
c
SB
FB
W = constant
(1 + α) Qa = c
Qa = c
(1 + α)q =            + Caγ − u  
nR(c)
Figure 2. The First-Best (FB) and the Second-Best (SB) Allocations
Note: The shaded area corresponds to the region pR ≥ 0 (nonnegative reader price).
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In the reader-pays model, the author fee is zero, and the budget breaking condition 
of the journal is
 pRnR ≥ γnA.
Eliminating pR between these two conditions, we obtain the inequality character-
izing the feasible set of the journal in the reader-pays model:
(19)    Q a(nA) ≥ c(nR) +   γ __ nR  .
Note that the feasible set under open access (where pR = 0) corresponds to the 
same condition, where γ is set equal to 0 (since γ is recovered by author fees), and 
the inequality is replaced by equality:
(20)    Q a(nA) = c(nR).
Since γ > 0, we see that in order to attract the same number of readers, a RP 
journal has to offer a higher quality than an OA journal. This is the basic intuition 
behind our main result. The RP model imposes more discipline on quality choice.
Figure 3 represents the two feasible sets and the indifference curves of the asso-
ciation. Under fairly general conditions the optimal choice of the association will 
entail higher quality (and possibly larger readership) under reader-pays than under 
open access.
Of course, Figure 3 does not imply that open access always leads to a subopti-
mal level of quality. In fact, as we already noted, open access is indeed second best 
optimal when the association maximizes social welfare. This is why we now char-
acterize formally the outcomes of reader-pays and open access, in order to compare 
them with the first-best and second-best outcomes. In this section, we consider that 
the association’s objective is to maximize the sum of the readers’ utilities given by:
(21) TuR =  ∫ 
0
 
nR
   {[Q a(nA ) − c( y)]nA − pR}  dy,
where TuR means total utility of readers. Since nR and pR satisfy the indifference 
condition of the marginal reader, i.e.
 uR(nR : nA ) = [ Q a(nA ) − c(nR)]nA − pR = 0,
we can replace pR by [Q a(nA ) − c(nR)]nA in (21). We find
 TuR(nA, nR) ≡  nA  ∫ 0 
nR
   [c(nR) − c(y)]  dy.
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B. Reader-Pays
As we already saw, the feasible set of a reader-pays journal is characterized by
(22)    c(nR) +   γ __ nR  ≤ Q a(nA ).
The left-hand side of (22) is u-shaped in nR. If its minimum is higher than the maxi-
mum quality qmax , the feasible set is empty. We, therefore, have to assume that qmax is 
large enough to avoid this problem. In this case, for a given nA, there may be two values 
of nR that satisfy (22) with an equality. It is always optimal to choose the highest.
Therefore, the association maximizes TuR(nA, nR) with respect to (nA, nR), 
subject to (22). Define LRP = TuR − λ2[nAc(nR)nR + γnA − nR  ∫0 nA   q(x) dx], where λ2 represents the Lagrangian multiplier associated with (22). Then, the first-order 
conditions with respect to nA and nR are given by
(23)     ∫ 
0
 
nR
   [c(nR) − c(y)] dy = λ2[c(nR)nR + γ − nR q(nA)],
and
(24)    nAnRc′(nR) = λ2 cnAc(nR) + nAc′(nR)nR −  ∫ 0 
nA
   q(x) dx d .
Since (22) is binding at the optimum, we have
(RP )    c(nR)nR  +  γ =  nRQ a(nA ).
RP
RP OA
OA
c(nR)
Qa(nA)
Figure 3. The Reader-Pays (Rp) and the Open-Access (OA) Allocations
Notes: The dashed lines correspond to the indifference curves of the association. The utility of 
the association increases in the direction of the arrows.
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From (RP ), (23), and (24), we obtain
(25) c a(nR) = q(nA ) +   γ __ nR   c​c 
a(nR) − c(nR)  ___________ 
nRc′(nR)   − 1d .
Let ( n A  RP ,  n R  RP ) denote the association’s optimal choice under the reader-pays model. It 
is characterized by (RP) and (25). Since c′(nR) > 0 and c a(nR) < c(nR), (25) implies 
that c a(nR) < q(nA). Similarly, (RP ) implies that Q a(nA) > c(nR).
PROPOSITION 3: (not-for-profit and reader-pays) consider a not-for-profit jour-
nal run by an association maximizing the total utility of its readers. under reader-
pays, the allocation chosen by the association ( n A  RP ,  n R  RP ) is characterized by (RP) 
and (25). In particular,
  (i)  the average quality of published articles is higher than the reading cost 
of the marginal reader, and
  (ii)  the average reading cost is lower than the quality of the marginal article.
C. Open Access
Before studying open access, we note that in our model, the association maxi-
mizing readers’ utilities prefers open access to reader-pays as long as the marginal 
author’s benefit from publication is larger than γ.21 The association can at least 
choose the same quality standard that is chosen under reader-pays. Then the move 
to open access increases the number of readers and increases the sum of readers’ 
utilities.22 This argument also shows that the association prefers open access to any 
hybrid model in which the journal combines author fees with a positive subscription 
price.
We now consider open access ( pR = 0). This, together with uR(nR : nA) = 0 implies:
(OA) c(nR)nA =  ∫ 0 
nA
   q(x) dx.
The association maximizes TuR(nA, nR) with respect to (nA, nR, pA) subject to (OA), 
the budget breaking (BB) constraint:
(BB) ( pA − γ)nA ≥ 0,
21 In footnote 29, we give the condition that makes the marginal author’s benefit under open access larger than 
γ, in the case of the iso-elastic distribution functions.
22 However, we do not expect all incumbent journals to switch to the open access model in the real world 
because of the budget constraint of authors (which we did not model for simplicity). As Dewatripont et al. (2006) 
argue, unless a level playing field is created for open access journals (in comparison with reader-pay journals), 
which requires policy makers to provide funding for publication costs, it seems infeasible that a large number of 
existing journals simultaneously move to open access.
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and the authors’ participation constraint:
(PcA ) uA(nA : nR) = αAq(nA )nR +  u − pA ≥ 0.
Note that pA does not appear in the objective of the association. Without loss of 
generality, we assume that the association selects the lowest price that is compat-
ible with (BB), namely pA = γ. In what follows, we study the association’s choice of (nA, nR), assuming that (PcA ) is slack at pA = γ.
Define LOA = TuR − λ3[c(nR)nA −  ∫0 nA   q(x) dx] where λ3 represents the 
Lagrangian multiplier associated with (OA). Then, the first-order conditions with 
respect to nA and nR are given by
(26)  ∫ 
0
 
nR
   [c(nR) − c(y)] dy = λ3 [c(nR) − q(nA)],
(27) nAnRc′(nR) = λ3nAc′(nR).
From (26) and (27), we obtain
(28) q(nA ) =   ∫0 
nR
   c(y) dy
 _________ nR  (≡ c a(nR)).
Let ( n A  OA ,  n R  OA ) denote the association’s optimal choice under open access. It is char-
acterized by (OA) and (28). (OA) means that the average quality is equal to the read-
ing cost of the marginal reader. In a somewhat symmetric fashion, condition (28) 
means that the average reading cost c a(nR) is equal to the quality of the marginal 
author’s article.
PROPOSITION 4: (Not-for-profit and open-access) consider a not-for-profit jour-
nal run by an academic association maximizing the total utility of its readers. 
under open access, the allocation ( n A  OA ,  n R  OA ) optimally chosen by the association is 
characterized by two conditions:
  (i)  The average quality of published articles is equal to the reading cost of 
the marginal reader.
  (ii)  The average reading cost is equal to the quality of the marginal article.
V.  Comparison of All Four Cases
In this section, we compare four scenarios (first-best, second-best, not-for-profit 
journal with open-access, not-for-profit journal with reader-pays) in terms of average 
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quality of the articles published in the journal and number of readers. To facilitate 
the comparison, we choose a particular specification, that we call “iso-elastic”:23
 q(nA) = qmax[1 − (nA ) εq ]   and   c(nR) = cmax(nR ) εc .
In our iso-elastic specification we have:
 Q a(nA) =  εq qmax + q(nA )  ___________1 + εq  ,
and
 c a(nR) =  c(nR) _____1 + εc   .
A. Average Quality
PROPOSITION 5 (Average quality): consider a not-for-profit journal run by an 
academic association maximizing the total utility of its readers. In the case of iso-
elastic distributions, we have:
 Q a( n A  RP ) > Q a( n A  SB ) > Q a( n A  fB ) > Q a( n A  OA ).
The association chooses too high a quality standard under the reader-pays model 
and too low a quality standard under open access.
PROOF: See the Appendix.
Note that Q aOA and Q aRP depend neither on the externality parameter α nor on 
authors’ fixed benefit u since the association does not internalize them. Furthermore, 
under open access, γ has no impact on the quality choice of the association since 
there are (by assumption) sufficiently many authors who are willing to pay pA = γ 
to publish their articles. But the social planner internalizes the net publication cost 
γ − u. Therefore, as long as γ − u is positive, because of the lack of budgetary dis-
cipline, the association publishes too many articles under open access, Q aOA < Q aSB.
Under the reader-pays model, the association has to recover γ by charging the sole 
readers. By contrast, what matters for the social planner is γ − u. This, together with 
the fact that the association does not internalize the authors’ benefit, makes the reader-
pays association publish too few articles compared with the second-best, Q aRP > Q aSB.
The intuition for why the change from reader-pays to open access induces a qual-
ity degradation can be given in two steps. First, given the quality standard chosen 
under the reader-pays model qmin = q( n A  RP ), the move to open access increases the 
number of readers to n′R determined by c(n′R) = Q a( n A  RP ). Second, in the case of iso-
elastic distributions, the condition q( n A  RP ) > c a(n′R) holds, which implies that the 
23 The specification q(nA) = K n A  −εq  would not work, since it would imply q(0) = +∞, and hence unbounded 
article qualities.
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association finds it optimal to lower the standard to publish more articles. Basically, 
the reader-pays model imposes too much discipline on quality because of the need 
to recover γ,  while the open access model imposes too little discipline since γ is 
financed with author fees.
B . Readership Size
We now compare readership size in the four regimes. First, comparing the first-
best outcome with the second-best, we find:
 c SB < c fB,
which implies  n R  
fB
  >  n R  SB  . Furthermore, under open access, the marginal reader is 
determined by the average quality of articles (i.e., Q a = c(nR)). Since, by Proposition 5, 
the average quality is higher under the second-best than with an open access asso-
ciation, readership size is larger in the former than in the latter. Therefore, we have:
  n R  
fB
  >  n R  SB  >  n R  OA  .
We now compare the policy of an open access association with that of a reader-
pays association in terms of readership size. The comparison gives
  n R  
OA
  ⪌   n R   RP  if and only if εq  ⪌    1 _____ 1 + εc  .
If εq > 1/(1 + εc), the change from the reader-pays model to the open access  model 
increases the readership size of the journal run by the association, as could have 
been expected. But a rather surprising result holds if εq < 1/(1 + εc). In this case, 
open access reduces readership size. This occurs because even though readers do 
not pay for subscription, the average quality of the journal becomes very low under 
open access. Basically, there is a conflict between low-cost readers and high-cost 
readers over the choice of quality standard. The former prefers a low standard while 
the latter prefers a high standard. When εq < 1/(1 + εc), the conflict is severe24 and, 
hence, resolving the conflict in favor of low-cost readers by lowering quality stan-
dards induces many high cost readers to stop reading the journal.
Summarizing, we have:
PROPOSITION 6 (Readership size): consider a not-for-profit journal run by an 
academic association maximizing the total utility of its readers. In the case of iso-
elastic distributions, we have
  n R  
fB
  >  n R  SB  >  n R  OA  .
24 For instance, a small εc means that a small change in c creates a large change in nR. Therefore, as εc 
decreases, a given quality degradation, that induces a decrease in the marginal c through Q a = c, induces a larger 
reduction in nR.
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The journal attracts too few readers under the open access model. Moreover:
  n R  
OA
  ⪌  n R  RP  if and only if εq ⪌  1 _____ 1 + εc  .
The change from the reader-pays model to the open access model increases the 
readership of the journal if εq > 1/(1 + εc), and reduces it if εq < 1/(1 + εc).
Qa = c
q
qmax
0 c
RP
SB 
OA
Qa − q = c − Qa   
1 + εc
Qa = c + γ   
nR(c)
q = Ca(nR)Qa − q = c − Q
a   
1 + εc
Figure 4. The Allocations Chosen by a Not-For-Profit Journal 
When εq < 1/(1 + εc) (OA: Open-Access, Rp: Reader-Pays)
qmax
0
SB 
OA
q = Ca(nR)
RP
Qa = c
q
c
Qa−q=c−  Qa   
1 + εc
Qa = c + γ   
nR(c)
Figure 5. The Allocations Chosen by a Not-For-Profit Journal 
When εq > 1/(1 + εc) (OA: Open-Access, Rp: Reader-Pays)
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Figures 4 and 5 illustrate the allocations chosen by the association under open 
access and under reader-pays together with the second-best allocation.
C. Social Welfare
In this subsection, we compare the reader-pays model with the open access model 
in terms of social welfare, when the journal’s objective is to maximize the sum of 
readers’ utilities. Consider the special case εq = 1/(1 + εc) in which, as seen from 
Proposition 6, the number of readers remains the same (i.e.,  n R  RP  =  n R  OA  = nR). Then, 
from Section II, we have:
  ∂W ___ ∂nA  = (1 + α)nR q(nA) − (γ − u) − nRc 
a(nR).
Under open access, c a(nR) = q( n A  OA ) holds. Then, from the participation constraint 
of the marginal author, we have u + αAnRq( n A  OA ) ≥ γ. Plugging these two condi-
tions into the above first-order derivative shows that increasing the number of accepted 
papers increases social welfare (i.e., ∂W/∂nA > 0 for nA =  n A  OR ). This implies that the 
open access model dominates the reader-pays model in terms of social welfare.
Consider the case in which the number of readers is larger under open access than 
under the reader-pays model (i.e., εq > 1/(1 + εc) holds). Then, we can also prove 
that the open access model dominates the reader-pays model. We proceed in two 
steps. First, suppose that the move from open access to reader-pays does not change 
the number of readers. Then, we know from the previous argument that W ( n A  OA ,  n R  OA ) > W ( n A  RP ,  n R  OA ). Second, when we keep the quality standard (hence, the number of 
papers accepted) constant at q( n A  RP  ), W( n A  RP  ,  n R  OA ) > W( n A  RP ,  n R  RP ) must hold. Since 
open access is second-best optimal for any given quality standard, and the number 
of readers under open access is smaller when the quality standard is q( n A  OA ) than 
when it is q( n A  RP ), the reduction in the number of readers from  n R  OA  to  n R  RP   , when the 
standard is fixed at q( n A  RP ), reduces social welfare.
Finally, when εq < 1/(1 + εc), the change from reader-pays to open access reduces 
the number of readers. In this case, we cannot obtain a general result. However, we 
have performed analytical computations25 and simulations26 suggesting that open 
access is likely to dominate the reader-pays model in terms of social welfare as long 
as the marginal author’s participation constraint is slack under open access.
Summarizing, we have:
PROPOSITION 7: consider a not-for-profit journal maximizing the sum of readers’ 
payoffs. In the case of iso-elastic distributions, as long as open access does not lead 
to a significant reduction in terms of readership, the open access model leads to a 
higher social welfare than the reader-pays model.
25 For instance, the Taylor expansion of W around γ = 0 shows that open access dominates the reader-pays 
model in terms of social welfare. Computations are available from the authors.
26 In fact, simulations show that as εq decreases, the relative performance of reader-pays over open access in 
terms of social welfare improves.
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VI.  Robustness
In this section, we show that our main result (open access can lead to quality deg-
radation) is robust in the case of the two-sided pricing model in which both authors 
and readers pay, and when the journal maximizes impact. The analysis of the for-
profit journal is relegated to the Appendix.
A. The Two-Sided Pricing Model
In this section, we consider the case in which the journal cannot recover the entire 
publication cost through author fees because of the authors’ budget constraint and study 
the transition from the reader-pays model to the two-sided pricing model in which the 
journal complements author fees with a positive subscription price. Let B(< γ) be the 
maximum amount authors can pay. Under the two-sided pricing model, the journal 
charges an author fee equal to B and recovers (γ − B)nA through a subscription price:
 pR nR = (γ − B)nA.
Let γ′ ≡ γ − B. Then, the two-sided pricing model is equivalent to a reader-pays 
model in which γ is replaced by γ′. Hence, we need to know how the quality standard 
under the reader-pays model changes as γ decreases. In the Appendix, we show that 
this quality standard decreases as γ decreases in the case of iso-elastic distribution 
functions. Summarizing we have:
PROPOSITION 8: consider a not-for-profit journal maximizing the sum of readers’ 
utilities in the case of iso-elastic distribution functions. When each author is budget 
constrained and can afford to pay at most a fee B(< γ), the move from the reader-
pays model to the two-sided pricing model:
  (i ) Always induces a quality degradation.
  (ii ) Also reduces the number of readers if εq < 1/(1 + εc).
PROOF: 
See the Appendix.
B. Impact-Maximizing Journal
Maximizing the utility of readers is a reasonable objective for a reader-pays (not-
for-profit) journal, since readers are also the members of the association that controls 
the journal. However this objective may seem less natural for an open-access journal. 
Thus, the move from reader-pays to open-access may be accompanied by a change 
in objective. To account for this possibility, and as a robustness check, we consider 
an alternative objective for the journal. We assume that it endeavors to maximize its 
impact, measured by the sum of all readers’ benefit from reading the journal:
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 IM(nA, nR) ≡  nR  ∫ 0 
nA
   q(y) dy.
IM is proportional to the number of citations of the article or to the number of pat-
ents derived from it.
The association maximizes IM(nA, nR) with respect to (nA, nR, pA ) subject to (OA), 
the budget breaking constraint (BB) and the authors’ participation constraint (PcA ):
(OA)  c(nR)nA =  ∫ 0 
nA
   q(x) dx,
(BB)  ( pA − γ)nA ≥ 0,
(PcA)  uA(nA : nR) = αAq(nA)nR + u − pA ≥ 0.
As before, pA does not appear in the objective of the association. Without loss of 
generality, we assume that the association selects the lowest price that is compat-
ible with (BB), namely pA = γ. In what follows, we study the association’s choice of (nA, nR) assuming that (PcA ) is slack at pA = γ.
Define LIM,OA = IM(nA, nR) − λ4[c(nR)nA −  ∫0 nA   q(x) dx], where λ4 represents the 
Lagrangian multiplier associated with (OA). The Appendix shows that the alloca-
tion chosen by the impact-maximizing organization under open access, denoted by ( n A  IM,OA ,  n R  IM,OA ), is characterized by (29) and (OA).
(29)    q(nA) =  c(nR) __________  
1 +  nRc′(nR) ______
c(nR) 
 .
Furthermore, in the iso-elastic case, this allocation coincides with the alloca-
tion chosen by an open-access journal maximizing the utility of its readers. Indeed 
condition (28) (marginal quality equals average readers cost) coincides, in this case, 
with condition (29), since
 c a(nR) =  1 __ nR   ∫ 0 
nR
   c(y) dy =   c(nR) _____
1 + εc    =   
c(nR) __________  
1 +  nRc′(nR) ______
c(nR) 
 .
PROPOSITION 9: 
  (i) under open access, the allocation chosen by an impact-maximizing journal ( n A  IM,OA ,  n R  IM,OA ) is characterized by (OA) and (29).
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  (ii) In the case of iso-elastic distributions, this allocation coincides with the allo-
cation chosen by a journal who maximizes the utility of its readers.
PROOF: 
See the Appendix.
Proposition 9 shows the robustness of our main conclusion, at least in the iso-
elastic case. Independently of whether the journal maximizes its impact or the util-
ity of its readers, it chooses the same quality standard, which is below the socially 
efficient level.
VII.  Concluding Remarks
We showed that for an electronic academic journal, social welfare maximiza-
tion implies open access given that subscription prices cannot be negative. This 
is because the marginal cost of distribution is zero, while readers exert positive 
externalities on the rest of society. We also examined the consequences of a move 
from the reader-pays model to the open access model by considering journals run 
by not-for-profit associations or by for-profit publishers. The reader-pays model 
imposes too much discipline on quality since the journal has to recover publica-
tion costs from subscription fees, and the journal does not internalize the positive 
externalities on authors and society. Under open access, a for-profit journal does 
not internalize reading costs and can have an incentive to publish low-quality 
articles to increase its profit from author fees. What is rather surprising is that the 
move to open access may generate quality degradation even for a not-for-profit 
journal maximizing readers’ payoffs (and, hence, internalizing reading costs). 
The basic intuition is simple. Under open access, the association does not internal-
ize the cost of publication (which is covered by author fees), while a social-welfare 
maximizing journal internalizes this (net of authors’ fixed benefit from publi-
cation). Furthermore,  quality degradation can even make the number of readers 
smaller under open access than with the reader-pays model. This happens when 
publishing too many articles induces a large number of high cost readers to stop 
reading the journal. However, as long as open access does not reduce readership, 
we find that the open access model  unambiguously gives higher social welfare 
than the reader-pays model, in the case of a not-for profit journal maximizing 
readers’ utilities.
Even though we did not model library subscriptions under the reader-pays model, 
our main results seem to be robust to the introduction of this feature, as long as we 
maintain the assumption that the journal charges a uniform subscription price. First, 
note that library subscription plays no role under open access. Under the reader-pays 
model, as a first approximation, we can reinterpret a reader in our model as a group 
of readers for which a library makes the subscription decision. Then, a library will 
subscribe only if the total benefit of its group is larger than the sum of the subscrip-
tion price and the total reading cost of its group. Hence, library subscription decisions 
would also impose some discipline on the quality standard of the reader-pays model.
It would be interesting to extend our analysis to the case in which the journal can 
signal the quality of an accepted article by giving it one among several ratings. For 
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instance, some B.E. journals in economics give one among three quality ratings 
(Advances, Contributions, Topics).27
There are other interesting issues to study regarding open access journals. One 
of them is to know how the change in the pricing model affects competition among 
journals. There is a “bottleneck argument” 28 according to which the change from 
reader-pays to open access would promote competition. Indeed, once articles are 
published in journals, each journal is a bottleneck and has a monopoly power on its 
content. However, at the submission stage (i.e., prior to publication), journals are sub-
stitutes and compete for attracting authors. A formal modeling of the consequence 
of open access on authors’ submission policies, together with readers’ choices, could 
provide interesting insights into this “bottleneck argument.”
Appendix: Characterization of All Four Outcomes  
in the Case of Iso-Elastic Distributions
In what follows, we characterize all four outcomes (the first-best, the second-best, 
and the allocations chosen by the association maximizing readers’ payoffs under 
reader-pays and under open access) in the case of iso-elastic distributions.
1. The first-best allocation:
The first-best allocation is characterized by two conditions:
(8)  (1 + α)q(nA ) =  γ − u _____ nR  + c a(nR),
and
(9)    (1 + α)  ∫ 
0
 
nA
   q(x) dx = nAc(nR).
Condition (8), expressed in terms of (q, c) leads to:
(A1)    (1 + α)q =    (γ − u)(cmax ) 
1/εc 
  ____________  c 1/εc  +   
c _____ 
1 + εc  .
Condition (9), expressed in terms of the same variables leads to:
(A2)    (1 + α)[εq qmax + q ] = (1 + εq)c.
27 The simple model we considered at the end of the Appendix to analyze a for-profit journal shows that 
publishing some low-quality articles together with high-quality articles can be socially optimal when articles 
generate large positive externalities on the society. In this case, completely revealing each article’s quality reduces 
social welfare since readers will read only high quality articles.
28 For instance, Dewatripont et al. (2006, 67): “there are two (nonconflicting) theoretical possibilities for 
increasing price competition in the market: shift price competition to a level where journals are viewed as substi-
tute rather than complement or make researchers and users more price sensitive.”
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Substracting (A1) from (A2) leads to:
(A3)  aεq +  εc _____ 1 + εc  b​c −    
(γ − u)(cmax ) 1/εc   ____________  c 1/εc  = (1 + α)εq  qmax.
Let ΦfB(c) ≡ (εq + (εc/(1 + εc))) c − ((γ − u)/ c 1/εc ). Since ΦfB(c) increases from ΦfB(0) = −∞ to ΦfB(+ ∞) = + ∞, there is a unique solution to (A3), denoted
c fB ≡ c( n R  fB  ). Replacing c by (1 + α)Q a (this results from (9)) into (A3) and divid-
ing (A3) by (1 + α) gives:
(A4)  aεq +  εc _____ 1 + εc  b​Q a −   
(γ − u)(cmax ) 1/εc   _______________  (1 + α ) 1+1/εc  (Q a  ) 1/εc    = εq qmax.
Q afB ≡ Q a( n A  fB  ) is the unique solution of (A4).
2. The second-best allocation:
It is characterized by two conditions:
(17)    (1 + α)q(nA) =  (γ − u) ______nR  +  
 ∫0 nR   c(y) dy ________ nR  +  αc(nR) ______nRc′(nR)  [c(nR) − q(nA)]
and
(18)    c(nR) = Q a(nA).
After replacing nRc′(nR) = εcc(nR) into (17) and expressing everything in terms 
of (q, c), we obtain:
  a1 + α +  α __ εc  b​q =   (γ − u)(cmax ) 
1/εc 
  ____________  c 1/εc   +   
c _____ 
1 + εc   +   
αc ___ εc  ,
from which we get:
(A5)    q =   (γ − u)(cmax ) 
1/εc 
  _____________  (1 + α +  α __ εc  ) c 1/εc   +    
c _____ 
1 + εc  .
Since q = (1 + εq)Q a − εq qmax = (1 + εq)c − εq qmax (the latter equality results 
from (18)), condition (A5) becomes:
(A6)  aεq +  εc _____ 1 + εc  b​c  −   
(γ − u)(cmax ) 1/εc   _____________  (1 + α +  α __ εc  )  c 1/εc    =  εq qmax.
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c SB  (≡ c( n R  SB  )) is the unique solution of (A6). Furthermore, we have c SB = Q aSB ≡ Q a( n A  SB  ).
3. Reader-pays:
The allocation chosen under the reader-pays model is characterized by two 
conditions:
(RP )    c(nR) +   γ __ nR  = Q a(nA ),
and
(25) c a(nR) = q(nA ) +   γ __ nR   c​c 
a(nR) − c(nR)  ___________ 
nRc′(nR)   − 1d​.
Since c = cmax  n R  εc  , (RP) is equivalent to
(A7)    Q a = c +  γ (cmax  ) 
1/εc 
 ________  c 1/εc  .
If we express (25) as a function of c, using c a = c/(1 + εc), q = (1 + εq)Q a − εq  qmax 
and (A7), we get:
  c _____ 
1 + εc  = (1 + εq )cc +  
γ (cmax  ) 1/εc  ________  c 1/εc  d​−​εq  qmax +   
γ (cmax ) 1/εc  ________  c 1/εc     c​
​ c ____ 1 + εc  − c ________ εcc − 1d​,
and after simplifications:
(A8)  aεq +  εc _____ 1 + εc  b​c −    
γ (cmax  ) 1/εc  (  1 ____ 1 + εc   − εq )   _________________ c 1/εc   = εq qmax.
For the comparison with open access in terms of readership, we also write the 
following equation, which is equivalent to (A8):
  aεq +  εc _____ 1 + εc  b​c +  
γ __ nR  aεq −  1 _____ 1 + εc  b = εq  qmax.
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4. Open access:29
The allocation chosen by a not-for-profit journal under open-access is character-
ized by two conditions:
(OA) c(nR)nA =  ∫ 0 
nA
   q(x) dx.
and
(28) q(nA ) =   ∫0 
nR
   c(y) dy
 _________ nR  (≡ c a(nR)).
From q = (1 + εq)Q a − εq qmax, (28) becomes
(A9)  (1 + εq)Q a − εq qmax =  c _____ 1 + εc  .
Replacing c with Q a in (A9) gives Q aOA:
(A10)  aεq +  εc _____ 1 + εc  b​Q aOA  = εq qmax.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5:
When we replace c with Q a in (A6), compare it with (A4), and use the fact that 
(1 + α ) 1+1/εc > (1 + α + (α/εc)), we find
 Q aSB > Q afB.
It is easy to compare the first-best allocation with the allocation chosen by an open-
access association in terms of average quality. Indeed, comparing (A4) with (A10) 
tells us immediately that
 Q afB  > Q aOA.
We now compare the second-best allocation with the reader-pays outcome, again, 
in terms of average quality. Replacing c with Q a − (γ (cmax ) 1/εc )/ c 1/εc into the first 
term of (A8) gives
29 In the case of the iso-elastic distribution functions, the marginal author’s benefit under open access is larger 
than γ if the following condition holds:
  
αA ______ 
1 + εc  c​ εq __________  εq +   εc _____ 1 + εc     qmax d​ 
 
1+εc _____ εc   > (γ − u) (cmax )  1 __ εc   .
Note that this condition holds if qmax or αA is large enough or cmax is small enough.
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(A11) aεq +  εc _____ 1 + εc  b​aQ a −  
γ(cmax ) 1/εc  _______  c 1/εc   b   −   
γ(cmax ) 1/εc  _______  c 1/εc  a​ 1 _____ 1 + εc  − εqb
​ = aεq +  εc _____ 1 + εc  b​Q a  −   
γ(cmax ) 1/εc  ________ [  ˜    c(Q a ) ] 1/εc  = εq  qmax,
where  ˜    c(Q a ) is the largest c that satisfies (A7). This function is defined for
 Q a >  min  
c
   cc +    γ(cmax  ) 1/εc  ________  c 1/εc  d.
As already mentioned, we assume that qmax is large enough for this set to be non 
empty. In this case, Q aRP is determined by (A11). Q a >  ˜    c (Q a ) implies
(A12)  aεq +   εc _____ 1 + εc  b​Q a −   
γ(cmax ) 1/εc  _______ (Q a  ) 1/εc  > aεq +   
εc _____ 
1 + εc  b​Q a −   
γ(cmax  ) 1/εc  ________ [ ˜    c (Q a ) ] 1/εc  .
Let  ˜  
   
 Q a denote the solution of
(A13)  aεq +  εc _____ 1 + εc  b​Q a −  
γ(cmax ) 1/εc  _______ (Q a  ) 1/εc   = εq qmax.
Note that the left hand side of (A12) increases with Q a, while the right hand side 
equals εq qmax when Q a = Q aRP, by condition (A11). Then, (A11) and (A12) imply 
that  ˜  
   
 Qa < Q aRP. Comparing (A13) with (A6) (and in the latter condition, replacing 
c with Q a ) leads to  ˜      Q a > Q aSB, which in turn implies Q aRP > Q aSB. Since we know 
that Q aSB > Q afB, we have finally:
 Q aRP > Q aSB > Q afB > Q aOA.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 8:
Since the two-sided pricing model is equivalent to a reader-pays model in which γ 
is replaced by γ′(< γ), we examine below how the quality standard under the reader-
pays model changes as γ decreases. Consider first the case with εq ≥ 1/(1 + εc). 
We suppose that γ strictly decreases and that Q a weakly increases and find a con-
tradiction. Note first that these two conditions imply that c strictly increases. This is 
because c is the maximum value satisfying
(RP ) Q a = c +   γ(cmax  ) 
1/εc 
 ________  c 1/εc    .
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After substituting (γ(cmax ) 1/εc )/( c 1/εc ) with Q a − c into the following equation, which 
characterizes the optimal Q a:
  aεq +  εc _____ 1 + εc  b​Q a −    
γ(cmax ) 1/εc  _______  c 1/εc  = εq qmax,
we find:
  aεq −  1 _____ 1 + εc  b​Q a + c = εq qmax.
Since the left-hand side of the equation strictly increases, but the right-hand side 
remains unchanged, we have a contradiction. Therefore, the move to the two-sided 
pricing case generates quality degradation as long as εq ≥ 1/(1 + εc).
Consider now εq < 1/(1 + εc). From the following equation that characterizes the 
optimal nR,
  aεq +  εc _____ 1 + εc  b​cmax  n R  εc  +  
γ __ nR   aεq −   1 _____ 1 + εc  b = εq qmax,
we find
  
dnR ___ 
dγ   =    
−Qεq −   1 _____ 1 + εc  R​​​​_______________________________    SQεq +  εc _____ 1 + εc   R εc cmax  n R  εc  −  γ __ nR  Qεq  −   1 _____ 1 + εc  RT
​  >  0.
This implies that as γ decreases, the number of readers nR (and hence c(nR)) strictly 
decreases. However, from (RP), c cannot decrease if γ decreases and Q a weakly 
increases. Therefore, Q a must strictly decrease.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 9:
The first-order conditions with respect to nA and nR are given by
(A14)  nR q(nA) = λ4[c(nR) − q(nA )];
(A15)     ∫ 
0
 
nA
   q(y) dy = λ4 nAc′(nR).
Condition (A15) is equivalent to
(A16)  λ4  =   ∫0 
nA
   q(y) dy
 _________ 
nAc′(nR)  > 0.
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Replacing λ4 in (A14) with the expression in (A16) gives
(A17)  nR q(nA )c′(nR ) = Q a(nA )[c(nR) − q(nA)].
Since (OA) is binding, we have that Q a(nA ) = c(nR). Rearranging (A17) gives (29).
Analysis of a For-Profit Journal: As another robustness check, we consider the case 
of a for-profit journal. Since this case is more complex, we use a simpler version of 
our model in which all readers are homogenous and have the same reading cost per 
article c > 0. As before, authors differ in terms of the quality of their article, but 
the distribution of qualities is now Bernoulli. A fraction ν of authors have articles 
of high quality, denoted by qH, and a fraction 1 − ν of authors have articles of low 
quality, denoted by qL ∈ (0, qH). We introduce two assumptions:
ASSUMPTION 1: νqH + (1 − ν)qL < c.
ASSUMPTION 2: (qH − c) > γ and u + αAqH > γ.
Assumption 1 says that if all articles are accepted, the average quality is lower 
than the reading cost, which implies that no reader reads the journal. In other words, 
Assumption 1 means that the certification service provided by the journal is essen-
tial. Assumption 2 says that if the journal publishes only high-quality articles, the 
journal is viable both under the reader-pays model and under the open access model. 
More precisely, if all readers read a high-quality article, under reader-pays, the sum 
of readers’ net benefits from reading it is larger than the publication cost and, under 
open access, the author’s benefit is larger than the publication cost.
The journal’s editorial policy consists of the probability of accepting a high- 
quality article, denoted by βH, and the probability of accepting a low-quality article, 
denoted by βL, where a low-quality article can be published (i.e., βL > 0) only if βH = 1. Equivalently, this editorial policy can be interpreted in terms of the mini-
mum quality standard qmin and the number of articles to publish nA with prioritiza-
tion of high-quality articles. To simplify our analysis, we assume that the refereeing 
cost is zero and hence the submission fee is zero.
1. Benchmark: Second best:
We study the social optimum under the constraint that the social planner cannot 
force a reader to read the journal when the average quality of the journal is below 
the reading cost. From Assumption 2, all high-quality articles should be published 
(i.e., βH = 1). Regarding βL, let  __ β  L be defined by
  
νqH + (1 − ν) __ β  LqL  ______________  ν + (1 − ν) __ β  L  ≡  c,
which is equivalent to
  (1 − ν) __ β  L(c − qL) = ν(qH − c).
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According to Assumption 1 and Assumption 2, such  
__ βL exists and  __ βL ∈ (0, 1). It is 
not optimal to choose βL >  __ βL since, in this case, the journal will not be read. For βL ≤  __ βL, social welfare from publishing low-quality articles is given by
 SWL(βL ) = (1 − ν)βL[(1 + α)qL − (γ − u) − c].
If a low-quality article is published, the gain to society is u + (1 + α)qL, while 
society incurs the publication cost γ and the reading cost c. Therefore, βL =  __ β  L is 
optimal if and only if u + (1 + α)qL ≥ γ + c: otherwise, βL = 0 is optimal.
2. Reader-pays:
Consider now a reader-pays for-profit journal. Define the average quality of the 
journal as follows:
 Q a(βH, βL ) ≡   νβH qH + (1 − ν)βLqL  _______________  νβH + (1 − ν)βL .
The profit is zero if the average quality is lower than the reading cost. Otherwise, 
the maximum price that the journal can charge a reader for subscription is 
[νβH + (1 − ν)βL ](Q a − c). Therefore, the profit is given by
  ΠRP(βH, βL ) = [νβH + (1 − ν)βL ][Q a(βH, βL) − c − γ]
  = [νβH qH + (1 − ν)βLqL ] − [νβH + (1 − ν)βL ](c + γ) .
Profit maximization leads to βH = 1 from Assumption 2 and βL = 0 from 
Assumption 1.
3. Open Access:
Consider now an open access for-profit journal. As before, the profit is zero if the 
average quality is lower than the reading cost. Otherwise, the maximum price that 
the journal can charge for publication is u + αAqH if βL = 0 or u + αAqL if βL > 0. 
Hence, if u + αAqL ≤ γ, the journal will not publish any low-quality articles (i.e., βL = 0) and will choose βH = 1 from Assumption 2. This outcome is equivalent to 
the one under the reader-pays for-profit journal. When u + αAqL > γ, conditional 
on βL > 0, profit maximization leads to βL =  __ β  L (and βH = 1). In this case, we need 
to compare the profit obtained when (βH, βL) = (1, 0) with the one obtained when (βH, βL ) = (1,  __ β  L ). The difference between the two is
 ν(u + αAqH − γ) − [ν + (1 − ν) __ β  L](u + αAqL − γ)
 = ναA(qH − qL) − (1 − ν) __ β  L(u + αAqL − γ).
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Therefore, the journal chooses (βH, βL ) = (1,  __ βL ) if and only if
 u − γ + αAqL ≥    ναA(qH − qL)  __________ (1 − ν) __ β  L    =  
αA(qH − qL)(c − qL)  _______________ (qH − c)    .
Otherwise, the journal chooses (βH, βL ) = (1, 0).
Summarizing, we have:
PROPOSITION 10: under A1-A2,
 (i)  high-quality articles are always published under any of the three cases: sec-
ond-best, reader-pays for-profit, open access for-profit.
  (ii) As for low-quality articles:
  a.  In the second best outcome, βL =  __ β  L is optimal if and only if u − γ + (1 + α)qL ≥ c: otherwise, βL = 0 is optimal.
  b.  A reader-pays for-profit journal always chooses βL = 0.
  c.  An open access for-profit journal chooses βL =  __ β  L if and only if
 u − γ + αAqL ≥    αA(qH − qL)(c − qL)  _______________ (qH − c)  .
Otherwise, it chooses βL = 0.
COROLLARY 1:
 (i)  The quality standard chosen by a reader-pays for-profit journal is (weakly) 
higher than both the one chosen by an open-access for-profit journal and the 
second best quality standard. Therefore, the change from the reader-pays 
model to open access (weakly) creates quality degradation.
  (ii) If c is larger than u − γ + (1 + α)qL, the quality standard chosen by an open 
access for-profit journal is (weakly) lower than the second best standard.
A reader-pays for-profit journal has no interest in publishing low quality articles 
since including any low quality article only reduces readers’ willingness to pay for 
the subscription. However, publishing a low quality article may be socially desirable 
when the positive externalities on the society are large enough. Therefore, a reader-
pays for-profit journal tends to have too high a standard since it does not internal-
ize these externalities. On the contrary, an open access for-profit journal does not 
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internalize readers’ reading costs as long as the average quality of the journal is 
larger than the reading cost per article c. Therefore, it may have an incentive to 
degrade the quality by publishing low quality articles until the average quality of 
the journal becomes equal to c. This quality degradation is profitable as long as 
the positive effect from publishing more articles dominates the negative effect from 
reducing the author fee (since an author’s benefit is larger when publishing a high-
quality article than when publishing a low quality article). Therefore, if publishing 
low quality articles is not socially desirable because of a high c, the change from the 
reader-pays model to open access weakly creates quality degradation.
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